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Tranching refers to the number of securities offered as part of the same transaction, with 
riskier parts of the ‘pie’ sliced off into different baskets and sold to investors with differing risk 
appetites.  Loan tranching is an important mechanism that facilitates financing for riskier companies 
by  matching  their  borrowing  needs  with  investors’  risk  and  return  profiles.    A  well  functioning 
tranching market is also important for facilitating loan finance in different countries around the 
world. 
 
In this paper, we examine factors that influence the propensity for loan tranching around the 
world.  As well, we examine the structure of tranches within a loan in terms of the difference in 
spreads between the highest quality and lowest quality tranches.  Our paper contributes to the 
literature on how country-level investor protection shapes firm-level financial contracting.  The law 
and finance view is that the general legal mechanism to efficient financial contracting is the legal 
protection  of  outside  investors  –  whether  shareholders  or  creditors  –  through  laws  and 
enforcements (see Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008; Haselmann, Pistor 
and Vig, 2009). The alternative Coasian view (Bergman and Nicolaievsky, 2007) is that regulations of 
financial  markets  are  unnecessary  because  sophisticated  investors  write  financial  contracts 
regardless of legal and institutional conditions.   
 
Existing studies evidence that the legal environment affects the way loans are structured 
(e.g., Bae and Goyal, 2009, and Esty and Megginson, 2003). One empirical approach is to consider 
each tranche separately, assuming they are unrelated. For instance, Bae and Goyal (2009) show that 
borrowers located in countries with better creditor rights are able to raise larger loan facilities (i.e., 
tranches). However, borrowers primarily care about the ultimate size of the loan (i.e., the sum of all 
the tranches). If creditor rights also affect the extent of tranching, the overall effect on borrowers 3 
 
may become more complex. Similarly, Esty and Megginson (2003) examine the effect of legal risk on 
lending terms at the facility level in connection with project finance, without taking into account the 
fact that borrowers often raise their loans in different facilities.
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We examine a very large sample of loans from the LPC DealScan database.  We study data 
from over 100,000 loans (not facilities/tranches) among 115 countries over the years 1995–2009.  
Our approach is unique insofar as we consider the structure of such loan tranches by taking the loan 
level as unit of observation.  As well, while other papers focus on publicly traded companies in 
DealScan through merging the database with other databases such as Worldscope (Bae and Goyal, 
2009), in this paper we do not merge the DealScan data with datasets on publicly traded companies 
because a substantial portion of the loans are made to firms that are not publicly traded. The private 
firms comprise the more interesting part of the DealScan data we examine.  DealScan only has 28% 
of  observations  from  publicly  traded  companies.    By  considering  private  firms,  we  reveal  many 
interesting findings in relation to legal and other factors that influence tranching in an international 
setting. 
 
Broadly  speaking,  the  data  examined  are  consistent  with  the  legal  approach  of  financial 
contracting.    We  observe  a  greater  use  of  tranching  in  English  common  law  countries  than  in 
countries of other legal origins (French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist), and a narrower range 
of spreads among tranches of a same loan in common law countries.  These findings are consistent 
with the view that common law countries are better able to quickly adapt to complex legal issues, 
such as those involving tranched securities, and exhibit lower transaction costs.  The data further 
indicate tranching is less prevalent among countries where corruption is more problematic, which 
                                                           
1 Another set of studies takes a country-level approach (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, and Djankov et al., 
2007,  2008);  there,  the  problem  does  not  arise,  but  this  approach  cannot  account  for  borrower 
characteristics. 4 
 
suggests that tranching is more costly due to the resulting inefficiency and because managers in 
corrupt countries require more monitoring.  As well, there is evidence that the extent of tranching 
and the spread of tranches depend on the efficiency of debt markets and creditor rights.  Also, this 
paper  highlights  these  legal  differences  between  developed  and  developing  countries.    For 
developing countries, the data highlight pronounced inefficiencies and insensitivity to the economic 
factors that drive tranching among developed countries. 
 
In  addition  to  legal  conditions,  the  data  show  other  factors  that  affect  the  extent  of 
tranching: asymmetric information, borrower risk, transaction costs, and the presence of institutional 
investors.  First, the data strongly supports the view that loans have more tranches for private 
companies than public companies, and the price of tranches for private loans exhibits a much wider 
spread.  Second, companies without an investment grade credit rating use tranching more often, and 
the price range of these tranched loans is much greater.  These findings are explained by the fact that 
tranching is more pronounced when there is greater information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders, and the borrower is of greater risk.  As well, the data highlight the fact that a majority of the 
loans are non-investment grade, and all of the findings are much more applicable to this subset of 
non-investment grade loans.  Third, transaction costs strongly influence the extent of tranching.  For 
larger loans, it is much more cost effective to establish more tranches, because many of these costs 
are fixed costs.  Fourth, the extent of tranching reflects institutional abilities and experience, as 
tranching products are more complex. 
 
Our findings contribute to three related strands of literature.  First, and most directly, our 
paper relates to a growing literature on tranching.  The literature in tranching to a large degree is 
understandably focused on structured finance. Although tranching does not require securitization 
per se, securities created through securitization typically involve tranching.  Brennan, Hein, and Poon 
(2009) relate tranching of CDOs to the mechanism through which their rating is derived.  Given that 5 
 
CDO-underlying  assets  tend  to  be  more  highly  correlated  than  corporate  assets,  Brennan  et  al. 
theorize  that  there  is  higher  systematic  risk  in  CDO  tranches  than  tranches  of  similarly  rated 
corporate bonds. This risk can induce investment banks to tranche CDOs in order to get arbitrage 
benefits.    DeMarzo  (2005)  shows  pooling  assets  in  a  securitization  transaction  exacerbates 
information problems, but nevertheless also creates diversification benefits if these are not overly 
correlated.  As in Brennan, Hein, and Poon (2009) and DeMarzo (2005),  Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 
(2008), Hamerle, Liebeg, and Schropp (2009), and Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005) likewise focus 
on tranching in connection with structured finance, and find evidence that asymmetric information 
and market segmentation plays a role in the tranching of securitized assets. However, these studies 
consider securitized assets and not loans directly, unlike in our paper.  By contrast, we focus on 
tranches of corporate (syndicated) loans, and thus testing this hypothesis is not within the scope of 
our data set.  We study tranching of single loans instead and not a portfolio of loans; that is, our 
focus  is  not  on  structured  finance  but  on  syndicated  loans,  thereby  making  the  concern  of 
correlations within, and credit ratings of, asset pools inapplicable to our context. 
 
Second, our paper closely relates to the literature on the optimal structure of debt. Indeed, 
from the perspective of the borrower, tranching a large loan into segments of different risk-return 
profile is similar in spirit to choosing its optimal capital structure, in particular debt structure. Prior 
work has examined the choice between public and private debt, notably by emphasizing the extent 
of dispersion of debt held, which influences renegotiation of claims in the event of default (see, e.g., 
Hege and Mella-Barral, 2005, and Hackbarth, Leland, and Hennessy, 2007). Often this context is 
restricted to cases in which debt is not widely held.  Although this literature provides guidance as to 
the choice between public (widely held) and private (closely held) debt, it does not offer as much 
insight into the issuance of different claims of debt simultaneously, as is done in tranching.  
 6 
 
  Third, our paper likewise relates to the growing literature on syndicated lending and law and 
finance.  Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007), Djankov et al. ( 2008) and Haselmann, Pistor and Vig 
(2009)  construct measures of debt efficiency and enforcement around the world, and show that 
these measures strongly relate to legal origin, and influence the availability of loan finance.  Building 
on a large literature that studies the factors that affect credit spreads, Bae and Goyal (2009) examine 
the effect of legal protection on loan size, maturing, and interest rate spreads for 48 countries 
around the world, and show that in countries with weak legal protection banks are more likely to 
reduce loan amounts, shorten loan maturities, and increase loan spreads.  Similarly, Mansi, Maxwell, 
and Wald (2009) find that differences in state laws influence the structure of loan contracts in the 
U.S. However, based on our review of this and related literature, prior work does not examine the 
extent or structure of loan tranches in respect to legal differences around the world.  
 
Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by focusing for the first time on the extent 
and structure of loan tranches, and in an international context.  The findings, which are based on a 
very large worldwide data set, have a number of important managerial and policy implications for 
understanding when tranching can be used to efficiently pass on risks of loans to investors.  Further, 
we highlight institutional difficulties among syndicated loan markets in developing countries and 
ways in which those difficulties can be overcome, such as through a greater presence of institutional 
investors. 
 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    Section  2  develops  testable  hypotheses.    Section  3 
presents the data and statistics.  Section 4 presents the multivariate analyses.  We summarize the 
concluding remarks and policy implications in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature on Tranching 
 7 
 
  The literature on securitization focuses on portfolios of loans, such as studies like Brennan, 
Hein, and Poon (2009).  In our context, by contrast, we focus on syndicated loans and not structured 
finance securitization.  This distinction is important, because loan syndication does not involve the 
pooling of assets before tranching takes place.  Instead, syndicated loans involve the tranching of a 
single loan in which different groups of banks and not a single group provide the full amount of the 
loan.  Unlike structured finance securitization, the underlying assets typically used to secure the loan 
stem  from  a  single  company  and  not  a  portfolio  of  investments.  Therefore,  the  rationales  for 
tranching in securitization contexts such as for collateralized debt obligations and mortgage backed 
securities (Brennan, Hein, and Poon, 2009) are not directly applicable to the context of loans from a 
single company. 
 
For  the  context of  syndicated  loan  tranching,  we  conjecture  that  there  are  five  primary 
factors that influence the extent of tranching: asymmetric information, borrower risk, transaction 
costs, the presence of institutional investors, and the legal system.  
 
Asymmetric Information between Borrower and Investors: 
 
Risky  tranches  can  be  purchased  by  institutional  investors  who  can  collect  specific 
information on borrowers. Because less risky investments are less “information sensitive” to the 
idiosyncratic risk of borrowers, senior tranches help to protect uninformed investors from competing 
with those who do have better information and thus are more willing to buy subordinated tranches 
(Boot and Thakor, 1993, Franke and Krahnen, 2008, and DeMarzo, 2005). Pronounced asymmetric 
information  creates  benefits  to  tranche  a  loan.  In  equilibrium,  uninformed  investors  buy  senior 
tranches; informed investors buy junior tranches, which are more information sensitive. Since the 
lack of a stock market listing is considered to generate greater asymmetric information, we expect 
unlisted borrowers to tranche their loans more often.  Further, this asymmetric information induces 8 
 
pricing with greater differences in rates between the lower quality and higher quality tranches within 
the same loan. 
 
Therefore, we conjecture that borrowers where asymmetric information is greater  are more 
likely to tranche their loans and there is a greater spread between the lowest and highest quality 
tranche within the same loan. Wide evidence shows that private firms exhibit greater asymmetric 
information (e.g., most recently, Sufi, 2007). Therefore, we test this prediction by comparing private 




Risky borrowers are more likely to have heterogeneous assets on their balance sheet or to create 
tranches with different risk levels through over-collateralization. In contrast, borrowers that only 
hold risk-free assets are not able to offer anything else other than risk-free tranches. In this case, 
there  are  no  benefits  at  all  to  tranche  a  risk-free  loan,  because  all  tranches  have  the  same 
characteristics. Loans of risky borrowers, on the other hand, can offer tranches with different risk 
levels  by  over-collateralizing  some  tranches,  and  by  paying  a  higher  rate  for  such  risk.  Thus, 
borrowers with pronounced risks, such as those that are not investment grade, are more likely to 
tranche loans, and there is a greater spread between the lowest and highest quality tranche within 
the same loan. 
 
Transaction Costs and Loan Size: 
 
Tranching  involves  costs  such  as  legal,  regulatory,  rating  agency,  and  servicing  costs 
(Brennan, Hein, and Poon, 2009). There are also costs of setting up a bank syndicate as well as 
document costs. Different tranching transaction costs are rather fixed, and can become substantial in 9 
 
percentage terms for small loans. Thus, smaller loans are less likely to be tranched, because the 
resulting tranches are too small and are not cost effective. 
 
Note that although we expect that a larger loan is more likely to be tranched, it is unclear 
whether the spread on tranches within the same larger loan is smaller or greater. The transaction 
costs theory provides no clear indication on the heterogeneity of tranches. Theoretical studies do not 
provide us with any empirical prediction on this question either. We therefore leave our analysis 
open, as an empirical question. 
 
Importance of Institutional Investors and Prioritization: 
 
In  a  country  where  institutional  investors  are  more  important,  tranching  is  more  likely 
because structured products are mostly (if not all) sold to institutional investors. Indeed, tranching 
enables them to prioritize some tranches over others, creating tranches with different risk profiles. 
Some institutional investors are more prone to invest in safer tranches (e.g., pension funds due to 
regulatory restrictions on investments in risky assets), but informed ones might buy the riskier ones 
(e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1993). Active investors are further more likely to be willing to purchase riskier 
tranches, because they manage risk through the monitoring of companies that issue tranches. We 
therefore expect loans originated in countries where institutional investors are more prevalent are 
more likely to be tranched. 
 
Here also, it is unclear whether the presence of institutional investors affects the spreads on 
tranches within the same loan. Indeed, if these institutional investors are active, we can expect 
tranches  to  be  more  heterogeneous;  however,  the  reverse  holds  if  they  are  passive  investors. 
Because we generally do not know which type an investor is, we cannot test the effect it has. Thus, 
we refrain from making an empirical prediction for our analysis. 10 
 
 
Legal Environment and Regulation: 
 
Several legal aspects are critical for facilitating tranching. The first dimension is how the legal 
environment  can  mitigate  asymmetric  information  and  moral  hazard  between  borrowers  and 
creditors. The other dimension important for debt holders is enforceability of laws and contracts. To 
disentangle  these  two  dimensions,  we  investigate  different  aspects  that  affect  the  risk  of  debt 
holders and their capacity to recover their loan in case of default. In particular, we incorporate three 
measures widely used in other studies: efficiency of debt markets, creditor rights, and the level of 
corruption in the country of the borrower. The first directly relates to the extent of asymmetric 
information, while the two others to transaction costs arguments of tranching loans. Creditor rights 
(as defined by La Porta et al., 1998) relate to the legal right of lenders to seize secured assets in case 
of  default.  The  easier  it  is,  the  lower  the  costs  of  tranching.  Corruption  (as  measured  by  the 
Corruption Perception Index), on the other hand, affects enforceability and thus the monitoring 
needs of lenders on borrowers. Similarly, more efficient debt markets (following here Djankov et al., 
2008, that measure efficiency as reduced costs of maintaining the company as a going concern) also 
affect enforceability and monitoring needs, with more efficient markets reducing these costs. We 
investigate  all  three  dimensions,  as  they  appear  to  provide  complementary  perspectives  of  the 
impact of the legal environment on loan tranching practices due to the way these different variables 
are measured. 
 
First, at a general level, La Porta et al. (1998) show English legal origin countries are more 
flexible legal systems that can accommodate and facilitate more complicated financial transactions.  
As such, we expect more frequent use of tranches in common law countries.  At the same time, we 
typically associate common law countries with lower costs of debt due to the fact that the legal 
system mitigates the costs of asymmetric information.  This lower expected cost reduces the price of 11 
 
risk and makes the spreads between high and low quality tranches within the same loan narrower.  
Djankov, Mceish, and Schleifer (2007) and Djankov et al. ( 2008) show that access to credit and more 
efficient  loan  markets  is  typical  with  common  law  English  legal  origin  and  information-sharing 
institutions. Based on this legal view, we expect therefore that loans originated in common law 
countries are more likely to be tranched but have narrower spreads between the lowest and highest 
quality tranche within the same loan.  In the alternative Coasian view (Bergman and Nicolaievsky, 
2007),  regulations  of  financial  markets  are  unnecessary  because  financial  contracts  take  place 
between sophisticated issuers and sophisticated investors, suggesting that the market can find a way 
to get around weak institutions.  Our empirical analyses below test these competing predictions. 
Second,  countries  with  more  efficient  debt  markets  have  lower  costs  associated  with 
asymmetric information due to the fact that risks and costs of bankruptcy are lower (La Porta et al., 
1998,  Djankov, Mceish, and Schleifer, 2007, and Djankov et al., 2008). This institutional benefit in 
turn reduces the need to have extensive tranching to segregate off lower quality levels of debt. Thus, 
loans originated in countries with more efficient debt markets are less likely to be tranched and have 
narrower spreads between the lowest and highest quality tranche within the same loan. 
 
Third, countries with stronger creditor rights increase the expected benefits to higher risk 
lenders, all else being equal (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, Djankov, Mceish, and Schleifer, 2007, and 
Djankov et al., 2008).  This increase in turn makes it more feasible to establish riskier tranches.  We 
expect these riskier tranches to be priced with a higher spread. This results in a wider range of prices 
for the tranches. In other words, loans originated in countries with stronger creditor rights are more 
likely to be tranched and have wider spreads between the lowest and highest quality tranche within 
the same loan. 
 
Fourth,  the  legal  system  likewise  induces  incentives  to  take  value-enhancing  risks  (John, 
Litov,  and  Yeung,  2009).    In  countries  with  weak  legal  systems  and  more  extensive  corruption, 12 
 
corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate corporate resources.  Hamerle, 
Liebeg, and Schrop (2009) show how tranches with high systematic risk can be generated and how 
arrangers can exploit this risk to their advantage.  To this end, we expect investors to be more willing 
to buy loans more extensively tranched that originate in countries with lower levels of corruption, 
but that these tranched loans have a higher differences in interest rates (spread) to reflect the more 
pronounced variation in risks. 
 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Our primary data source is the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) DealScan database from which 
we extract the details on syndicated loans.  Given our focus on tranching, our unit of observation is a 
loan and not a facility.  We use the full sample of 115 developed and developing countries and 
105,051 loans covering the years 1995–2009. We exclude transactions prior to 1995, since LPC has 
poor coverage of transactions outside the US prior to that year (Bae and Goyal, 2009). 
 
  We match the LPC database with information on market conditions in different countries 
around the world from Morgan Stanley Capital International.  As well, we use information on legal 
conditions that pertain to debt markets in different countries from Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer 
(2007) and Djankov et al. (2008), and legal origin variables as per La Porta et al. (1998).  Some of 
these legal variables vary over time, as indicated in Table 1.  Other legal variables are time invariant, 
and have been used in related work (Bae and Goyal, 2009).  We restrict our presentation of legal 
variables to a concise set that is pertinent to tranching, but do consider other legal variables used in 
Bae and Goyal (2009) and others.  We further match the data with annual, time-varying measures of 13 
 
corruption  from  Transparency  1  International.
2    Finally,  we  match  data  on  the  importance  of 
institutional investors from OECD.
3 
 
We  focus  on  two  dependent  variables  pertaining  to  tranching:  (i)  the  actual  number  of 
tranches of the loan, and (ii) the difference between the percentage spread of the highest quality 
tranche and the lowest quality tranche within the same loan.  We show the robustness of our results 
to an alternative measure of the second dependent variable as the ratio of the percentage spread of 
the highest quality tranche relative to the lowest quality tranche within the same loan.  All of the 
variables are defined in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
To test our factors that we believe affect tranching practices, we use the following measures 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2.  Information asymmetry is represented by a dummy variable equal to 
one  if  the  company  is  listed  on  a  stock  exchange.    Publicly  listed  companies  have  prospectus 
requirements to obtain a listing and on-going reporting requirements, while private companies have 
little or no disclosure obligations.  Borrower risk is represented by a dummy variable equal to one if 
the company’s senior debt is rated as investment grade (BBB and higher for S&P rating).  Transaction 
costs are represented by the size of the loan, as transaction costs are fixed and are comparatively 
less important the larger the size of the loan.  We use financial assets held by institutional investors 
relative to GDP in each country to whether the presence of institutional investors help borrowers to 
                                                           
2 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi  
3 OECD Market Database - Financial Market Trends 2008. 14 
 
tranche their loans.  Also, to test the importance of legal conditions, we use four variables: legal 
origin, efficiency of debt markets, creditor rights, and corruption.
4 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
  Table 3 provides a number of summary statistics.  Overall, in the data for all observations, 
31.6% of the deals are tranched.  Among the tranched deals, the average number of tranches is 
2.509.  However, there is substantial variation in the sample, with a maximum of 29 tranches for one 
deal. Overall, 95% [90%] of all deals have no more than 6 [3] tranches.  
 
Unlike Bae and Goyal (2009) and others who also use the DealScan database, we do not 
merge with datasets on publicly traded companies because a substantial portion of the loans are 
made to firms that are not publicly traded. The private firms comprise the largest (and potentially 
most  fruitful)  part  of  the  data  we  examine.    In  Table  3  we  report  the  data  only  have  28%  of 
observations from publicly traded companies. If we were to merge our dataset with other data on 
publicly traded firms such as Worldscope, we would exclude more than half of the DealScan sample.
5 
The potentially most interesting part of the sample, at least for examining tranching, is from private 
firms. Finally, merging our sample with Worldscope may particularly affect less developed countries 
so that the number of countries considered would be reduced and thus also the variation in legal 
variables.  
 
                                                           
4 We considered a number of alternative legal indices but did not materially impact the variables reported, with 
exceptions in cases where there was excessive collinearity across variables. 
5 The tradeoff from examining both private and public companies herein is that we have fewer variables on 
firm-specific  factors.    Public  traded  companies  have  reporting  requirements  from  which  additional 
explanatory  variables  can  be  created.    Here,  we  are  able  to  compare  private  to  public,  and  consider 
investment grade ratings, etc. (see Tables 1 and 3), and do so with a much larger dataset with more than 
twice the number of observations relative to a dataset from only publicly traded companies. 15 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics and comparison tests for tranched versus non-tranched 
deals.  The data indicate public companies are less likely to have a tranched loan: 29.5% of non-
tranched loans have a public listing and 24.6% do not, and these differences are significant at the 1% 
level and consistent with our prediction about asymmetric information.  In further support of this 
prediction, note that 68.6% of tranched loans are corporations but only 61.0% of non-tranched loans 
are corporations, which is a difference significant at the 1% level.  Consistent with expectations on 
borrower risk, for borrowers that have tranche, 7.2% of the borrowers are investment grade, but for 
deals that are not tranched 11.4% are not investment grade, and these differences are significant at 
the 1% level.   
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
  Table 3 also shows support for the impact of transaction costs insofar as loans with tranches 
are  significantly  larger.    The  average  non-tranched  loan  size  is  $317  million,  while  the  average 
tranched loan size is $520 million.  Further, the presence of institutional investors appear to be an 
important  factor  as  tranched  loans  are  significantly  more  common  in  countries  with  a  greater 
presence of institutional investors. 
 
  Table 3 indicates legal conditions further matter across countries for tranching.  Eighty-two 
percent of loans are tranched in common law countries, but only 72.3% of loans are tranched in civil 
law  countries,  as  expected.    By  contrast,  countries  with  more  efficient  debt  markets  have  less 
tranching, consistent with our discussion in Section 2.  The average country efficiency rating for non-
tranched loans is 81.0% versus 79.6% for tranched loans, and these differences are significant at the 
1% level.  Countries with higher creditor rights indices are significantly more likely to be tranched: 
the average creditor rights are 1.629 for the subsample of deals that are tranched, and 1.499 for the 
subsample that are not tranched.  Finally, countries with higher levels of corruption have loans that 16 
 
are  more  likely  to  be  tranched,  but  the  differences  are  not  economically  large.    The  average 
corruption ranking for tranched loans is 8.285, and it is 8.364 for non-tranched loans. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the average and maximum number of tranches used in each 
country, as well as the spread range.  The country with the most number of tranches on average and 
widest spread range is Laos.  A number of countries in the data have no tranches (indicated by the 
value 1 in Table 4) and others have very small spread ratios.  English common law countries have on 
average fewer tranches (1.57) and narrower spreads (60.84) than French civil law countries (1.79 and 
63.37, respectively).  German legal origin countries have an average of 1.63 tranches and an average 
spread of 27.36.  Scandinavian legal origin countries have an average of 1.46 tranches and an average 
spread of 96.21.  Finally, socialist legal origin countries have an average of 1.38 tranches and an 
average spread of 31.38.  Panel B of Table 4 statistically compares the differences by legal origin.  
English legal origin countries have more tranches and lower spreads than Scandinavian legal origin 
countries, and English legal origin countries have lower spreads than French legal origin countries, 
consistent with our prediction.  The other differences by legal origin are not consistent with our 
expectations; nevertheless, these difference tests do not control for other things being equal, unlike 
our multivariate analyses below. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
  Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables in the data.  The correlations with 
the primary dependent variables and our results are generally consistent with the comparison tests 
discussed in conjunction with Table 3.  The correlations provide strong support for predictions on the 
effect of asymmetric information, borrower risk and transaction costs.  There is a significant negative 
correlation between tranching and public listings (-0.083) as well as spreads (-0.039) and spread 
ratios (-0.018).  There is a significant negative correlation between investment grade and tranches (-17 
 
0.070), spread differences (-0.090) and spread ratios (-0.030).  There is a significant positive relation 
between deal amounts and tranches (0.186).  There is a significant negative relation between the 
efficiency of debt markets and tranches (-0.071).  Similarly, there is a significant positive relation 
between  tranches  and  creditor  rights  as  expected,  but  not  the  relation  with  spreads.    The 
correlations  generally  do  not  support  predictions  for  institutional  investors,  common  law,  and 
corruption,  respectively.    These  are  univariate  tests  only,  and  the  next  section  provides  further 
assessment  below.    The  other  correlations  in  Table  5  highlight  relations  between  variables  and 
problem areas of potential collinearity for our multivariate analyses in the next section. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
4. Multivariate Analysis 
 
To  assess  what  determines  tranching  in  the  syndicated  loan  market,  we  examine  two 
dimensions: the extent of tranching and the degree of heterogeneity of tranches in terms of rates 
from the lowest quality tranches relative to the highest quality tranches.  For consistency, we only 
examine  the  degree  of  heterogeneity  of  tranches  for  the  subsample  of  deals  that  are  actually 
tranched. For the first approach, we use the actual number of tranches of any given loan.  Results of 
these Poisson regressions are provided in Table 6 and discussed in Subsection 4.1.  We use Poisson 
regressions  because the  distribution  of the  dependent  variable  is extremely consistent  with  the 
Poisson distribution.  For the second approach, we use the difference in rates charged between the 
highest quality tranche and the lowest quality tranche.  We use OLS methods, and find alternative 
methods  to  account  for  fractional  dependent variables  such  as  a  logistic  transformation yielded 
consistent estimates.  Further, we compute ratios of the highest quality to lowest quality tranches of 
a given deal, and explicitly show those results as a robustness check.  We discuss the results from this 18 
 
second  approach  in  Subsection  4.2.    Finally,  in  Subsection  4.3  we  show  some  differences  for 
developed versus developing countries.  All of our regressions use clustered standard errors by year.
6   
 
4.1. The Extent of Tranching 
   
Table 6 provides the Poisson regressions for the extent of tranching.  The table has seven 
different  models  with  alternative  explanatory  variables  to  show  robustness.    In  support  of  the 
asymmetric information argument, borrowers that do not have a public listing are approximately 
18% more likely to have an extra tranche in each of the models, and these estimates are significant at 
the 1% level in every model.  Investment grade companies issue loans that are 40% less likely to have 
an extra tranche, consistent with the borrower risk argument.  Also, the data support the transaction 
costs explanation for tranching, as expected.  A one-standard deviation increase in loan size increases 
the probability of an extra tranche by 9%. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
  Table 6 provides little support for the institutional investors argument, which pertains to 
institutional investors.  Only Models 4 and 5 have a significant coefficient, and at the 10 and 5% 
levels,  respectively.    Model  5  indicates  a  one-standard  deviation  increase  in  the  importance  of 
institutional investors that increases the probability of an extra tranche by 4.6%. 
   
                                                           
6  We  considered  two-way  clustering  based  on  procedures  on  Mitchell  Petersen’s  webpage;  see 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm.  However, 
there does not exist procedures for two-way clustering for Poisson regressions, such as by year and country; 
two-way clustering with OLS was considered and the results were consistent with OLS with single clustering, 
but OLS is inappropriate given the distribution of the dependent tranching variable. 19 
 
Legal conditions have a very strong impact on tranching in all the models.  Common law 
countries are more likely to have an extra tranche, and the estimates are significant at the 1% level in 
all models, consistent with the prediction that common law legal systems help reduce asymmetric 
information costs.  The economic significance for common law ranges from 8.3% in Model 3 to 12.9% 
in Model 7.  Countries with more efficient debt markets are less likely to originate loans with an extra 
tranche, where a one-standard deviation increase in efficiency lowers the probability of tranching by 
7%, as expected.  This result is significant at the 1% level in all models.  Countries with stronger 
creditor  rights  are  more  likely  to  have  an  extra  tranche  (consistent  with  the  transaction  costs 
argument of better regulations), and all models show a significant coefficient at the 1% level.  A one-
standard  deviation  increase  in  creditor  rights  increases  the  probability  of  an  extra  tranche  by 
approximately  4.7%.    Finally,  countries  with  less  corruption  (indicated  by  higher  values  of  the 
corruption index) have more tranches, as expected from the transaction costs argument of better 
regulations.  This latter effect is significant at the 5% level in Model 6 and the 1% level in Model 7.  
The economic significance is such that a one-standard deviation increase in the corruption index 
increases the probability of an extra tranche by 3% in Model 6 and 6% in Model 7. 
   
The control variables include dummy variables for major industry groups and special purpose 
dummy variables.  As well, we include dummy variables for borrowers that are corporations and 
where ratings are not available.  We also consider excluding observations for non-companies as well 
as  non-rating  observations  (and  vice-versa),  and  the  results  discussed  above  are  not  materially 
different.  Further, the results are robust to controls for market conditions with MSCI returns around 
the prior month of the deal date (and the results are robust to considering alternative horizons), as 
well as GDP per capita in each country-year. 
 
4.2. The Structure of Tranching 
   20 
 
We provide OLS regressions for the difference in interest rates between the highest quality 
tranche and lowest quality tranche in Table 7.  Table 8 presents ratio analyses to complement the 
results in Table 7.  The results are generally consistent with the extent of tranching as reported in 
Table 6 and discussed in Subsection 4.1.  First, consistent with the view that private firm exhibit 
greater asymmetric information, Table 7 shows that public companies have a smaller spread by 
about  19  basis  points  between  the  lowest  and  highest  quality  tranches,  and  this  difference  is 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications.  Similarly, Table 8 shows that public companies have a 
smaller ratio by approximately three, and again the estimates are significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. 
 
 [Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here] 
 
  Investment grade loans have a spread that is approximately 64 basis points lower in all 
models in Table 7, and these estimates are all significant at the 1% level.  Likewise, the ratio in Table 
8 is lower by approximately 6.5, and this difference is significant at the 1% level in all models in Table 
8. 
   
The  evidence  shows  differences  in  rates  between  tranches  are  greater  for  larger  loans.  
Similarly, loans with more tranches have a wider range of spreads.  We do not explicitly control for 
the  number  of  tranches  in  view  of  the  control  for  loan  size,  but  either  way,  the  other  results 
pertaining to the hypotheses are robust.  The data do not show any relation between range of 
spreads and the importance of institutional investors. 
   
Common law countries have a significantly lower range of rates (by about 14-20% in Table 7, 
or a ratio of 7.5 to 9.3 in Table 8) in all models, with the sole exception of Model 7 in Table 8.  There 
is some support for the legal efficiency argument in Models 5 and 7 of Table 7, and Model 7 of Table 21 
 
8, as more efficient debt markets associate with a lower range of spreads.  The economic significance 
is  such  that  a  one-standard  deviation  decrease  in  efficiency  raises  the  range  of  spreads  by 
approximately eight basis points in Table 7 (or by a ratio of approximately two in Table 8).  Creditor 
rights relate statistically and positively to the diversity of spreads in Tables 7 and 8.  A one-standard 
deviation increase in creditor rights increases the range of spreads by about 6% in Table 7 and by a 
ratio of roughly four in Table 8.  Also, there is support in Tables 7 and 8 for the view that corruption 
affects the spread of tranches.  The data show less corrupt countries have higher ranges and ratios of 
spreads, implying that countries with less corruption price riskier tranches higher.  In other words, 
the data indicate that in more corrupt countries lenders are less likely to originate heterogeneous 
tranches with wider spreads as there would be less investor interest for the riskiest ones. 
   
Our findings are robust to a large number of control variables, as discussed in Subsection 4.1.  
We considered other controls but they did not materially affect the reported results.  For example, 
we did consider a control variable for the number of tranches in Tables 7 and 8, and this variable 
slightly lowered the p-values of some of the reported results, but overall did not materially impact 
the inferences drawn from the data and discussed above.  We do not report the specifications with 
the number of tranches as an explanatory variable in Tables 7 and 8 because this variable is arguably 
endogenous,  and  suitable  instrumental  variables  are  difficult  to  justify  in  this  context.    Other 
specifications  are  available  on  request.    The  next  subsection  presents  some  of  these  additional 
robustness checks. 
 
4.3. Further Robustness Checks 
   
In this section, we explicitly show robustness to subsets of the data for developed versus 
developing countries in Table 9, as well as investment grade versus non-investment grade in Table 
10.   22 
 
 
As pointed out by La Porta et al. (1998) and Bae and Goyal (2009), more developed countries 
tend to better enforce their laws but have weaker creditor rights. This finding raises the question of 
whether enforceability/efficiency and creditor rights are substitutes. Moreover, developed countries 
are more likely to have more sophisticated investors, which can lead to differentiated effects on 
tranches between developed and developing countries. Table 9 highlights a number of interesting 
findings.  First, regarding the asymmetric information argument, the data show that the effect of a 
public listing on tranching in developing countries is approximately 33% larger than in developed 
countries.  At the same time, loan prices in poor countries are completely insensitive to whether or 
not the company has a public listing.  This evidence highlights inefficiencies in the tranching market 
among developing countries.  
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
  Second, regarding the effect of being investment grade, it is approximately 59% larger in 
developed countries than developing countries in terms of tranching (Models 2 versus 4) and 290% 
larger in terms of pricing (Models 6 versus 8).  These findings are consistent with the idea that there 
are institutional frictions among developing countries. 
 
Third, the effect of deal size on tranching (the transaction costs argument) is approximately 
69% larger in developing countries.  Fourth, the effect of institutional investors on tranching is not 
only substantially larger in developing countries, but also the effect has the wrong sign for the subset 
of developed countries.  One explanation for these results is that institutional investors play a big 
role in facilitating tranches for developing countries, and tranches are much more effective for larger 
loans in developing countries. 
 23 
 
Table 9 shows that the effect of common law is larger for tranching in developing countries, 
but common law does not affect the pricing of spreads in developing countries (Models 5, 6, 9, and 
10), unlike developed countries (Models 7, 8, 11, and 12).  The efficiency of debt markets has a larger 
effect on tranching in developed countries than developing countries, and has an effect on the range 
of spreads only in developed countries and not developing countries.  Creditor rights have a stronger 
effect of tranches in developing countries, but only in developed countries do creditor rights affect 
the range of spreads (there is only weak evidence in Model 10, significant at the 10% level, for an 
effect of creditor rights on spreads in developing countries).  Corruption matters more for setting up 
tranches in developed countries than developing countries in ways expected, and corruption also 
matters more to the range of pricing spreads in developed countries, but in developing countries 
corruption is completely insensitive to pricing tranches. 
 
In sum, at a broad level, Table 9 shows that spreads in developing countries are much less 
sensitive or statistically invariant to the variables that affect the range of interest rates in developed 
countries.  By contrast, tranches are simply much less likely to be set up in the first place, and 
whether or not tranches are set up in developing countries depends in a much more pronounced 
way (relative to developed countries) on whether or not the company is publicly listed, the deal size, 
and the presence of institutional investors. 
 
Table 10 presents differences between subsets of the data for investment grade versus non-
investment grade loans in the data.  The majority of loans in the data are non-investment grade.  Our 
analysis of these subsamples is motivated by the fact that investment grade borrowers may enjoy 
little benefits from tranching, in contrast to risky borrowers. The effect may then be asymmetric 
between these two types of borrowers. The regressions in Table 10 highlight the fact that there is 
strong  support  for  all  of  the  hypotheses  for  non-investment  grade  loans,  and  the  findings  are 
consistent with those discussed above.  Indeed, we expect effects to be economically stronger for 24 
 
riskier  borrowers  that  have  the  capacity  to  set  up  loan  tranches  that  are  more  dissimilar.  This 
capacity in turn makes tranching more likely and differences between tranches bigger. 
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
Unlike the findings for non-investment grade loans, for investment grade loans the results 
are for the most part either economically smaller or insignificant.  First, note that for investment 
grade loans the number of tranches depends to a much smaller degree on whether or not the 
company is publicly listed (as a measure of asymmetric information): the coefficients in Models 3 and 
4 are roughly one-fourth the size of those for Models 1 and 2.  Also, relative spreads for tranches of 
investment grade loans is statistically insensitive to whether the company is publicly listed (only 
Model 12 has a marginally significant coefficient at the 10% level, and it is the wrong sign).  Second, 
note  that  tranching  is  approximately  15%  less  sensitive  to  deal  size  for  investment  grade  loans 
relative  to  non-investment  grade  loans.    Third,  all  of  the  legal  variables  are  insignificant  for 
investment  grade  loans  (with  the  sole  exception  of  Model  3  where  common  law  is  marginally 
significant at the 10% level and has the wrong sign, and this effect is not supported in Model 4).  
Overall, therefore, the evidence on the extent of tranching and the relative range of spread results 
apply to the subset of non-investment grade loans and not investment grade loans. 
 
5. Conclusions 
   
In this paper, we present new hypotheses and empirical evidence pertaining to the extent of 
loan tranching and the range of spreads on tranches for over 100,000 loans over the years 1995–
2009 for 115 countries.  As in the literature on structured finance and security design, the data 
highlight the role of information asymmetry and corporate risk in establishing and pricing separate 25 
 
tranches within the same syndicated loan.  Private companies and companies without investment 
grade ratings have substantially fewer tranches and much greater variation in spreads. 
 
We  further  show  that  the  differences  in  legal  origin,  creditor  rights,  corruption  and  the 
efficiency of debt markets have are important for understanding international differences in loan 
tranching.  Tranching is more frequent and spreads are narrower in common law countries.  Creditor 
rights facilitate tranches and increase spreads.  Debt market efficiency reduces tranching and reduces 
heterogeneity in spreads.  Corruption reduces tranching and the heterogeneity in spreads. 
 
We empirically show that a majority of tranched syndicated loans are for non-investment 
grade loans.  The findings and hypotheses in this paper are supported for non-investment grade 
loans.  For investment grade loans the results are either statistically insignificant or significant but 
much economically smaller relative to that for non-investment grade loans. 
 
The mechanisms that drive tranching and spreads of tranches work much more efficiently in 
developed  rather  than  in  developing  countries.    The  evidence  highlights  inefficiencies  of  debt 
markets in developing countries.  In developing countries tranches are simply much less likely to be 
set up in the first place.  Relative to developed countries, whether or not tranches are set up in 
developing countries depends in a much more pronounced way on whether or not the company is 
publicly  listed,  the  deal  size,  and  the  presence  of  institutional  investors.    For  tranched  loans  in 
developing countries, the relative range of spreads is much less sensitive to our proxies for risks and 
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TABLE 1: Definition of Variables 
        
Information on the dependent variables, deal-specific variables, and company variables are from the LPC DealScan database.  
     
Dependent Variables:     
Number of Tranches    Integer variable that gives the number of tranches the considered loan has. 
Spread Range    Difference in basis points between the lowest quality tranche and the highest quality tranche of a given loan (only 
defined for the subset of the tranched loans). 
Spread Ratio    Ratio of basis points of the lowest quality tranche over the highest quality tranche of a given loan (only defined for 
the subset of tranched loans). 
     
Deal-specific Variables:     
Deal Amount (in USD million)     Total amount of the loan (in USD million); sum of the different tranches. 
Specific Purpose: Real Estate 
(dummy) 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is to purchase real estate, and zero otherwise. 
Specific Purpose: Project Finance 
(dummy) 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is for realizing project finance, and zero otherwise. 
Specific Purpose: Work. Cap. (dummy)    Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is for working capital, and zero otherwise. 
Specific Purpose: Corp. Purposes 
(dummy) 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is for corporate purposes (i.e., investment), and zero 
otherwise. 
Specific Purpose: Debt Repay. 
(dummy) 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is to repay other debt, and zero otherwise. 
Specific Purpose: Other (dummy)    Dummy variable equal to one if the purpose of the loan is for any other expenses, and zero otherwise. 
     
Company-specific Variables:     
Borrower has Public Listing (dummy)    Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is listed on a public stock market, and zero otherwise. 
Borrower is a Corporation (dummy)    Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is a (non-financial) corporation, and zero otherwise. 
Investment Grade (dummy)    Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower's senior debt has an investment grade (i.e., its S&P rating is BBB or 
higher), and zero otherwise 
Borrower's Rating is not Available 
(dummy) 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower's rating on its senior debt is unavailable, and zero otherwise. 
     
Market Variables:     
Importance of Institutional Investors 
in Borrower's Country 
  Financial assets held by institutional investors as a fraction (not percentage) of the country’s GDP in the country of 
the borrower (Source: OECD Market Database - Financial Market Trends 2008). 
Real GDP per Capita in Borrower's 
Country 
  Real GDP per capita in the country of the borrower at time of deal close date. 
Market Return 1 Month Prior to Deal 
Close Date 
  One month return of the MSCI Index in the borrower's country at deal close date; when country index is not 














   
Legal Variables:     
Common Law (English) Origin of 
Borrower 
  Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is located in a common law country, and zero otherwise. 
Efficiency of debt markets in 
Borrower's Country 
  Efficiency measure of the borrower's country debt markets, as defined in equation (1) of Djankov et al. (2008); this 
index ranges from 1.2 to 96.1 and increases with the efficiency in debt markets.  The index reflects whether or not 
the company continues as a going concern, the cost of maintaining the company as a going concern, and the time to 
resolve insolvency. 
Creditor Rights    Index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998), this index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values 
implying stronger creditor rights. A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders are 
defined in laws and regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a 
debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization 
petition is approved, i.e., there is no automatic stay or asset freeze. Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the 
proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers. Finally, if 
management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. This index 
is also used in Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007) with time variation for the years 1978–2002; however, for the 
years 1995–2002, the only countries with time variation include Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and the Russian Federation 
(and these countries comprise a trivial proportion of our data; see Table 4).  Our sample comprises the years 1995–
2009.  An examination of creditor rights for possible time variation for the major countries in our data set does not 
change in a way that has material impacts on our results. 
 
Corruption    Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which 
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians (Source:              
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008); this index ranges from 0 to 10 and varies 
over time and across countries, with higher values implying less corrupt countries. 
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Expected Effect on Price (Lowest 
Quality versus Highest Quality 




Asymmetric Information  A dummy variable equal to one for 
whether the borrower is listed on a 
stock market.   
Negative: less of a need to tranche 
as more information is available 
about the company. 
Negative: less of a need to make 
dissimilar debt structures with less 
asymmetric information. 
Borrower Risk  A dummy variable equal to one if 
the borrower’s senior debt is 
investment grade. 
Negative: less of a need to tranche 
and separate out riskier assets for 
investment grade. 
Negative: less of a need to make 
dissimilar debt strictures with a less 
risky borrower. 
Transaction Costs  The size of the total syndicated loan.  Positive: transaction costs are fixed, 
and larger loans make tranching 
relatively less costly. 
Ambiguous 
Investor Type and Prioritization  Financial assets held by institutional 
investors in a country as a 
percentage of that country’s GDP. 
Positive: more sophisticated 
investors can understand tranches. 
Ambiguous 
Legal Origin  A dummy variable equal to one for 
common Law countries (La Porta et 
al., 1998). 
Positive: English common law 
systems are better able to 
accommodate more complicated 
tranching structures. 
Negative: less of a need to make 
dissimilar debt structures with less 
asymmetric information, which 
implies a lower price or narrower 
spread between tranches. 
 
Efficiency of Debt Markets  Efficiency of debt markets (Djankov 
et al., 2008). Higher values imply 
more efficient markets. 
Negative: less asymmetric 
information with more efficient debt 
markets, so less of a need to 
tranche.  
Negative: less of a need to make 
dissimilar debt structures with less 
asymmetric information, which 
implies a lower price or narrower 
spread between tranches. 
 
Creditor Rights  Creditor Rights (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Djankov et al., 2007).   Higher values 
imply stronger creditor rights. 
Positive: greater likelihood of 
repayment, even for riskier or 
unusual tranches. 
Positive: greater likelihood of 
repayment, even for riskier or 
unusual tranches, which lowers the 
price of riskier tranches. 
Corruption  Corruption Perception Index from 
Transparency International.   Higher 
values imply less corruption. 
Positive: especially for loans that do 
not qualify as investment grade, 
lower quality tranches are less 
attractive to investors when they 
originate from corrupt countries. 
Positive: especially for loans that do 
not qualify as investment grade, 
lower quality tranches with higher 
spreads are more attractive to 
investors only when they originate 
from less corrupt countries. 
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TABLE 3: Summary Statistics 
                       
All the variables are defined in Table 1. 




Sub-sample of Deals that are not 
Tranched (Number of Tranches = 
1) 
 
Sub-sample of Deals that are 









Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Number of Tranches   
 
1.567  1.221 
 
1.000  0.000 
 
2.709  1.238 
 
- - 
Spread Range   
 
61.094  129.749 
 
- -  - - 
 
61.094  129.749 
 
- - 
Spread Ratio   
 
7.248  50.710 
 
- -  - - 
 





                     




0.280  0.449 
 
0.296  0.457 
 







0.101  0.301 
 
0.114  0.318 
 
0.088  0.284 
 
0.000 




317.326  917.967 
 
245.016  649.289 
 
520.894  1436.157 
 
0.000 




0.633  0.482 
 
0.610  0.488 
 
0.740  0.439 
 
0.000 




0.121  0.326 
 
0.093  0.290 
 





                     
Importance of 




1.451  0.618 
 
1.452  0.616 
 
1.555  0.579 
 
0.000 




10.096  1.056 
 
10.167  0.948 
 
10.101  1.123 
 
0.000 
Market Return 1 Month 
Prior to Deal Close Date 
 
 
0.009  0.043 
 
0.009  0.043 
 





                     
Common Law (English) 
Origin of Borrower 
(+) 
 
0.735  0.441 
 
0.723  0.448 
 
0.820  0.384 
 
0.000 
Efficiency of debt 




80.068  18.236 
 
81.034  17.641 
 
79.588  17.104 
 
0.000 
Creditor Rights  (+) 
 
1.540  1.011 
 
1.499  0.944 
 
1.629  1.141 
 
0.000 
Corruption  (+) 
 
8.307  1.296 
 
8.364  1.186 
 
8.285  1.355 
 
0.000 




0.028  0.165 
 
0.034  0.182 
 








0.034  0.181 
 
0.024  0.154 
 
0.034  0.181 
 
0.000 




0.101  0.301 
 
0.113  0.317 
 
0.080  0.271 
 
0.000 




0.446  0.497 
 
0.498  0.500 
 
0.292  0.454 
 
0.000 




0.137  0.344 
 
0.130  0.336 
 
0.157  0.364 
 
0.000 




0.255  0.436 
 
0.201  0.400 
 





                     
Nbr. Observations   
 
104344 
   
71707 
   
22162 
     









TABLE 4: Tranching Practices by Country, grouped by Legal Origin 
                                
This table reports the statistics based on all syndicated loan transactions (not facilities) included in the LCP DealScan database. For the calculation of average Spread Range 
and Spread Ratio, we only use deals that are tranched. 





Mean Number of 
Tranches 






Australia  5989  1.87  1  79.02  5.34 
Bahamas  39  1.31  1  9.00  1.25 
Bahrain  109  1.21  1  14.00  1.35 
Bangladesh  19  2.37  1  18.75  1.07 
Barbados  2  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Bermuda  339  1.35  1  44.36  1.72 
Botswana  1  2.00  2   - -   - - 
British Virgin Islands  49  1.63  1  10.00  1.04 
Brunei  5  1.20  1  0.00  1.00 
Canada  3184  1.49  1  47.25  2.52 
Cayman Island  81  1.79  1  13.38  1.11 
Cyprus  36  1.31  1  0.50  1.02 
Egypt  111  1.68  1   - -   - - 
Estonia  41  1.29  1   - -   - - 
Ethiopia  3  1.33  1   - -   - - 
Fiji  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Ghana  41  1.10  1  98.33  1.71 
Gibraltar  5  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Guyana  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
India  1064  1.73  1  26.14  1.78 
Iran  69  1.29  1   - -   - - 
Iraq  6  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Ireland  426  1.52  1  74.99  8.06 
Israel  70  1.73  1  41.50  1.16 
Jamaica  13  1.69  2  233.19  7.57 
Kenya  14  1.36  1  200.00  1.57 
Laos  8  6.38  5.5  655.00  4.85 
Lesotho  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Liberia  31  1.39  1  9.38  1.07 
Libya  4  1.25  1   - -   - - 
Malaysia  1868  2.70  2  26.16  3.00 
Maldives  2  1.50  1.5   - -   - - 
Malta  20  1.20  1  327.50  2.55 
Mauritius  11  1.18  1  7.50  1.25 
Myanmar  3  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Namibia  5  1.00  1   - -   - - 33 
 
Nepal  1  3.00  3   - -   - - 
New Zealand  655  2.13  2  20.08  1.60 
Nigeria  42  1.43  1  81.67  1.51 
Pakistan  111  2.23  2  21.51  2.05 
Palestine  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Papua New Guinea  21  2.95  3  10.83  1.11 
Qatar  125  1.54  1  3.15  1.23 
Saudi Arabia  136  1.79  1  23.50  1.36 
Seychelles  4  2.00  2  66.67  1.30 
Singapore  1515  2.33  2  16.98  1.14 
Slovakia  234  1.29  1  46.49  16.03 
Sri Lanka  50  1.68  1  12.50  1.07 
Swaziland  3  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Tanzania  7  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Thailand  1322  2.39  2  12.91  1.25 
Trinidad  19  1.89  2  23.13  1.42 
Uganda  2  2.50  2.5   - -   - - 
United Arab Emirates  295  1.49  1  29.63  1.71 
United Kingdom  5030  1.78  1  119.51  27.84 
United states  59819  1.45  1  60.26  5.84 
Yemen  2  7.50  7.5   - -   - - 
Zambia  13  1.38  1  0.00  1.00 
Zimbabwe  10  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Total (Common Law)     83353     1.57     1     60.84     6.63 




Mean Number of 
Tranches 






Albania  5  2.4  2   - -   - - 
Algeria  20  2.55  1  0.00  1.00 
Andorra  1  2.00  2  2.50  1.13 
Angola  19  1.95  2  0.00  1.00 
Argentina  470  1.26  1  60.15  1.61 
Belgium  266  1.88  1  101.77  26.01 
Bolivia  7  1.43  1  12.50  1.04 
Brazil  730  1.27  1  41.54  1.33 
Burkina Faso  4  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Cambodia  8  1.38  1  300.00  1.75 
Cameroon  10  1.5  1  0.00  1.00 
Cape Verde  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Chile  371  1.25  1  15.97  1.19 
Colombia  148  1.20  1  23.66  1.15 
Congo  4  1.00  1   - -   - - 34 
 
Costa Rica  9  1.33  1  0.00  1.00 
Dominican Republic  14  1.57  1  25.00  1.10 
Ecuador  11  1.09  1   - -   - - 
El Salvador  18  1.33  1  37.50  1.19 
Equatorial Guinea  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
France  2436  2.14  1  110.69  20.29 
Gabon  2  2.00  2  0.00  1.00 
Greece  362  1.41  1  50.28  1.35 
Guatemala  16  1.31  1  255.00  4.30 
Guinea  4  2.75  3  0.00  1.00 
Honduras  19  1.37  1  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia  1516  2.00  1  16.24  1.34 
Italy  976  2.02  1  82.52  10.38 
Ivory Coast  22  1.23  1  58.33  1.42 
Jordan  18  1.22  1   - -   - - 
Kuwait  105  1.21  1  2.13  1.03 
Lebanon  2  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Lithuania  45  1.27  1  19.00  1.20 
Luxembourg  236  1.99  1  53.87  7.68 
Madagascar  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Mali  13  1.62  1  50.00  1.18 
Mauritania  1  2.00  2  0.00  1.00 
Mexico  725  1.43  1  32.56  1.33 
Monaco  6  1.33  1  100.00  1.40 
Morocco  16  2.06  1  37.50  1.38 
Mozambique  3  1.33  1   - -   - - 
Netherlands  1243  1.86  1  120.93  22.31 
Nicaragua  2  1.50  1.5   - -   - - 
Oman  74  1.50  1  19.17  1.31 
Panama  134  1.49  1  44.17  1.39 
Paraguay  3  1.33  1   - -   - - 
Peru  94  1.28  1  68.75  1.59 
Philippines  818  2.41  2  15.34  1.67 
Portugal  162  1.87  1  21.72  1.32 
Romania  131  1.53  1  29.21  1.16 
Senegal  6  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Spain  1444  1.75  1  62.57  10.18 
Syria  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Tunisia  35  1.51  1  0.00  1.00 
Turkey  626  1.29  1  46.79  2.19 
Uruguay  16  1.38  1  37.50  1.63 
Venezuela  88  1.45  1  49.04  1.35 
Vietnam  133  1.89  1  14.81  1.17 
Total (French)     13464     1.79     1     63.37     9.77 35 
 




Mean Number of 
Tranches 






Austria  123  1.36  1  86.53  23.93 
Bosnia  3  1.67  2   - -   - - 
Bulgaria  59  1.93  1  132.80  110.93 
China  1341  2.07  2  9.02  1.13 
Croatia  138  1.38  1  35.00  1.25 
Czech Republic  168  1.38  1  28.45  1.27 
Germany  1825  1.95  1  120.89  37.01 
Hong Kong  6450  2.03  1  7.75  1.45 
Hungary  226  1.43  1  37.67  9.38 
Japan  12107  1.20  1  22.22  5.49 
Korea (South)  3447  1.76  1  41.24  4.87 
Latvia  59  1.05  1  31.25  1.17 
Macau  27  2.67  2  54.46  1.16 
Macedonia  7  1.43  1  0.00  1.00 
Montenegro  1  3.00  3   - -   - - 
Poland  212  1.45  1  11.31  1.24 
Serbia  11  1.73  2  35.00  1.30 
Slovakia  96  1.13  1  51.00  1.22 
Slovenia  105  1.22  1  9.38  1.14 
Switzerland  446  1.64  1  74.75  18.13 
Taiwan  2735  2.12  2  21.26  1.86 
Yugoslavia  1  2.00  2   - -   - - 
Total (German)     29587     1.63     1     27.36     5.62 




Mean Number of 
Tranches 






Denmark  226  1.60  1  112.08  26.42 
Finland  309  1.56  1  93.09  13.17 
Iceland  145  1.21  1  15.06  1.22 
Norway  745  1.32  1  92.62  16.07 
Sweden  759  1.41  1  131.23  36.10 














Mean Number of 
Tranches 






Armenia  3  1.67  2   - -   - - 
Azerbaijan  39  1.82  2  56.25  2.40 
Belarus  25  1.44  1  2.50  1.01 
Georgia  9  1.78  2  85.00  1.45 
Kazakhstan  193  1.30  1  31.40  1.26 
Kyrgyzstan  1  1.00  1   - -   - - 
Moldova  1  2.00  2   - -   - - 
Mongolia  4  1.25  1   - -   - - 
Russia  1073  1.39  1  29.46  5.68 
Tajikistan  4  1.75  2   - -   - - 
Turkmenistan  4  1.50  1.5   - -   - - 
Ukraine  168  1.27  1  49.46  1.42 
Uzbekistan  23  1.17  1  0.00  1.00 
Total (Socialist)     1547     1.38     1     31.38  4.55 
 
Panel B: Comparison Tests for Differences in Tranching Practices by Legal Origin 
Legal Origin 
Mean Number of 
Tranches 
Median Number of 
Tranches  Average Spread Range  Average Spread Ratio 
Common Law (English Legal) Origin  1.57  1  60.84  6.63 
French Legal Origin  1.79  1  63.37  9.77 
German Legal Origin  1.63  1  27.36  5.62 
Scandinavian Legal Origin  1.46  1  96.21  20.61 
Socialist Legal Origin  1.38  1  31.38  4.55 
Tests of Means: 
English versus Civil Law   -11.79 ***   - -  31.00 ***   -3.52 *** 
English versus French   -16.01 ***   - -   -3.09 ***   -9.52 *** 
English versus German   -6.96 ***   - -  71.44 ***  5.31 *** 
English versus Scandinavian  4.06 ***   - -   -16.25 ***   -14.86 *** 
English versus Socialist  8.52 ***   - -  30.55 ***  3.72 *** 
French versus German  10.15 ***   - -  41.73 ***  11.69 *** 
French versus Scandinavian  11.24 ***   - -   -14.31 ***   -10.97 *** 
French versus Socialist  16.06 ***   - -  26.52 ***  8.24 *** 
German versus Scandinavian  6.25 ***   - -   -31.39 ***   -15.78 *** 
German versus Socialist  10.84 ***   - -   -4.01 ***  1.87 * 
Scandinavian versus Socialist  2.45 **   - -  27.59 ***  14.80 *** 
                 
 TABLE 5: Correlation Matrix 
                                               
All the variables are defined in Table 1. Correlations with "Spread Range" and "Spread Ratio" are done only with deals that are tranched (i.e., the variable "Number of Tranches" > 1). Significance level: * for 1%. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)   (14)   (15) 
 (1) Number of Tranches  1.000 
 (2) Spread Range    0.281*  1.000 
 (3) Spread Ratio    0.162*    0.426*  1.000 
 (4) Borrower has Public Listing (dummy)   -0.083*   -0.039*   -0.018*  1.000 
 (5) Borrower is a Corporation (dummy)    0.022*    0.080*    0.039*    0.231*  1.000 
 (6) Log(Deal Amount)    0.186*    0.092*    0.029*    0.153*    0.192*  1.000 
 (7) Investment Grade (dummy)   -0.070*   -0.090*   -0.030*    0.307*    0.107*    0.301*  1.000 
 (8) Borrower's Rating is not Available (dummy)    0.143*   -0.127*   -0.043*   -0.165*   -0.338*   -0.123*   -0.132*  1.000 
 (9) Importance of Institutional Investors in Borrower's Country   -0.065*    0.106*  0.000    0.226*    0.250*    0.116*    0.132*   -0.404*  1.000 
 (10) Log(Real GDP per Capita in Borrower's Country)   -0.111*    0.120*    0.041*    0.169*    0.239*    0.035*    0.097*   -0.419*    0.390*  1.000 
 (11) Market Return 1 Month Prior to Deal Close Date  -0.010  0.010  0.000    0.024*   -0.018*  0.000  0.010   -0.030*  0.010  0.000  1.000 
 (12) Common Law (English) Origin of Borrower   -0.034*    0.068*  -0.010    0.267*    0.146*    0.129*    0.130*   -0.199*    0.566*    0.309*    0.027*  1.000 
 (13) Efficiency of debt markets in Borrower's Country   -0.071*    0.036*  0.000    0.065*    0.117*   -0.052*    0.030*   -0.130*    0.248*    0.733*  0.000    0.284*  1.000 
 (14) Creditor Rights    0.121*   -0.072*    0.015*   -0.245*   -0.225*   -0.075*   -0.126*    0.369*   -0.511*   -0.385*   -0.024*   -0.334*   -0.098*  1.000 
 (15) Corruption   -0.070*    0.107*    0.049*    0.165*    0.188*    0.046*    0.096*   -0.345*    0.358*    0.748*    0.010*    0.329*    0.603*   -0.238*  1.000 









TABLE 6: Determinants of the Extent of Tranching 
                 
The dependent variable in all the specifications is "Number of Tranches", which gives the number of tranches for a given loan. Because this variable is an integer, the method of estimation is the Poisson regression. Values of coefficients 
reported are marginal effects. All the variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered by year. Significance levels are *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
Variables  Expected sign 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
 
               
Borrower has Public Listing (dummy)    (-) 
   -0.182 ***   -0.190 ***   -0.172 ***   -0.179 ***   -0.164 ***   -0.181 ***   -0.180 *** 
Investment Grade (dummy)  (-) 
   -0.400 ***   -0.400 ***   -0.398 ***   -0.397 ***   -0.396 ***   -0.399 ***   -0.395 *** 
Log(Deal Amount)  (+) 
   0.159 ***   0.157 ***   0.157 ***   0.154 ***   0.156 ***   0.159 ***  0.153 *** 
Borrower is a Corporation (dummy)   
   0.030 **   0.031 **   0.029 **   0.029 **  0.023   0.029 **   0.027 ** 
Borrower's Rating is not Available (dummy)   




Importance of Institutional Investors in Borrower's Country  (+) 
  0.012  0.015  0.032  0.043 *   0.075 **  0.009  0.036 
Log(Real GDP per Capita in Borrower's Country)   
   -0.062 ***  -0.019   -0.053 ***  -0.001  -0.002   -0.079 ***  -0.024 
Market Return 1 Month Prior to Deal Close Date   




Common Law (English) Origin of Borrower  (+) 
   0.094 **   0.129 ***   0.083 **   0.123 ***   0.092 **  0.129 *** 
Efficiency of Debt Markets in Borrower's Country  (-) 
   -0.004 ***   -0.004 ***   -0.003 ***   -0.006 *** 
Creditor Rights  (+) 
  0.037 ***  0.046 ***  0.048 ***  0.046 *** 
Corruption  (+) 
   0.021 **  0.044 *** 
 
 
               
Major Industry Group Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Specific Purpose Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
Number of Observations 
  105016  104872  104332  104190  104319  105013  104190 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 





TABLE 7: Determinants of Heterogeneity in Tranching (Range between Highest and Lowest Spread) 
                 
The dependent variable in all the specifications is "Spread Range", which measures the difference in basis points between the lowest quality tranche and the highest quality tranche of a given loan (only defined for the subset of loans that are 
tranched). The method of estimation is OLS. Regression (5) considers syndicated loan transactions for borrowers of emerging market countries only, and Regression (6) of developed countries. All the variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors 
are clustered by year. Significance levels are *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
Variables  Expected sign 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
 
               
Borrower has Public Listing (dummy)  (-) 
   -19.641 ***   -19.798 ***   -18.331 ***   -18.477 ***   -19.467 ***   -19.578 ***   -18.480 *** 
Investment Grade (dummy)  (-) 
   -64.150 ***   -64.284 ***   -63.187 ***   -63.292 ***   -63.598 ***   -64.098 ***   -63.241 *** 
Log(Deal Amount)  (?) 
  8.003 **  8.013 **  7.523 **  7.511 **  7.955 **  7.959 **  7.453 ** 
Borrower is a Corporation (dummy)   
  -0.24  -0.093  -0.588  -0.405  2.657  -0.446  -0.667 
Borrower's Rating is not Available (dummy)   




Importance of Institutional Investors in Borrower's Country  (?) 
  -1.541  -1.549  1.968  2.309  -0.998  -2.108  1.259 
Log(Real GDP per Capita in Borrower's Country)   
  11.788 ***  13.292 ***  13.132 ***  15.480 ***  15.600 ***  10.314 ***  14.139 *** 
Market Return 1 Month Prior to Deal Close Date   




Common Law (English) Origin of Borrower  (-) 
   -18.244 ***   -15.914 **   -20.563 ***   -16.844 **   -18.233 ***   -14.220 * 
Efficiency of debt markets in Borrower's Country  (-) 
  -0.157  -0.243   -0.477 ***   -0.394 *** 
Creditor Rights  (+) 
  5.536 **  5.953 **  5.422 **  5.971 ** 
Corruption  (+) 
  1.945  3.576 * 
 
 
               
Major Industry Group Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Specific Purpose Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
               
Number of Observations   
  22321  22305  22201  22185  22204  22321  22185 
Adjusted R-squared   
  7.0%  7.1%  7.1%  7.1%  7.0%  7.1%  7.2% 
 40 
 
TABLE 8: Determinants of Heterogeneity in Tranching (Ratio between Highest and Lowest Spread) 
                 
The dependent variable in all the specifications is "Spread Ratio", which measures the ratio of basis points of the lowest quality tranche over the highest quality tranche of a given loan (only defined for the subset of loans that are tranched). The 
method of estimation is OLS. All the variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered by year. Significance levels are *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
Variables  Expected sign 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
 
               
Borrower has Public Listing (dummy)  (-) 
   -3.339 ***   -3.330 ***   -2.549 ***   -2.568 ***   -3.097 ***   -3.284 ***   -2.572 *** 
Investment Grade (dummy)  (-) 
   -6.652 ***   -6.655 ***   -6.084 ***   -6.101 ***   -6.288 ***   -6.605 ***   -6.071 *** 
Log(Deal Amount)  (?) 
  0.483  0.475  0.191  0.187  0.427  0.444  0.153 
Borrower is a Corporation (dummy)   
  1.058  1,051  0.825  0.849  1.207  0.872  0.690 
Borrower's Rating is not Available (dummy)   




Importance of Institutional Investors in Borrower's Country  (?) 
  -3.583  -3.587  -1.058  -1.016  -2.741  -4.089  -1.652 
Log(Real GDP per Capita in Borrower's Country)   
  2.469 ***  2.321 ***  3.379 **  3.651 **  3.707 **  1.140 **  2.827 ** 
Market Return 1 Month Prior to Deal Close Date   




Common Law (English) Origin of Borrower  (-) 
   -7.459 *   -7.854 *   -9.302 *   -8.931 *   -7.450 *  -7.338 
Efficiency of debt markets in Borrower's Country  (-) 
  0.018  -0.027   -0.152 *   -0.118 ** 
Creditor Rights  (+) 
  3.688 **  3.740 **  3.475 **  3.753 ** 
Corruption  (+) 
  1.750 *  2.173 ** 
 
 
               
Major Industry Group Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Specific Purpose Dummies included?   
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
               
Number of Observations   
  22288  22272  22168  22152  22171  22288  22152 
Adjusted R-squared   




TABLE 9: Developed versus Under-developed Countries 
                                     
The dependent variable in all the specifications is "Number of Tranches" for Regressions (1) – (4), "Spread Range" for Regressions (5) – (8), and "Spread Ratio" for Regressions (9) – (12). The method of estimation is OLS for "Spread Range" and "Spread Ratio", and 
Poisson for "Number of Tranches". For the Poisson regressions, marginal effects are reported as coefficient estimates. All the variables are defined in Table 1, including the three dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered by year. Significance levels are 
*** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
   
Dep. Var. = Number of Tranches (Poisson) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
















(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
 
(7)  (8) 
 
(9)  (10) 
 
(11)  (12) 
 
 
                                   
Borrower has Public Listing 
(dummy) 
 
+ Tranches  
- Range 
 
 -0.190 ***   -0.214 ***   -0.161 ***   -0.161 ***  -6.072  -5.960   -19.463 ***   -17.684 ***  -2.017  -2.190   -3.041 ***   -2.204 *** 
Investment Grade (dummy) 
- Tranches 
- Range   
 -0.302 ***   -0.247 ***   -0.396 ***   -0.393 ***   -24.376 ***   -21.919 ***   -64.895 ***   -63.626 ***   -1.755 *  -1.061   -6.394 ***   -5.710 *** 
Log(Deal Amount) 
+ Tranches 
? Range   
0.223 ***  0.222 ***   0.148 ***   0.141 ***  6.995 ***  7.032 ***  7.890 ***  6.850 **  0.646  0.688  0.347  -0.146 
Borrower is a Corporation 
(dummy) 
 
   -0.096 *   -0.092 *   0.052 ***   0.048 ***   -5.421 *   -4.712 *  0.703  -0.494  0.869  0.918  0.888  0.303 
Borrower's Rating is not Available 
(dummy) 
 




Importance of Institutional 
Investors in Borrower's Country 
+ Tranches 
? Range    0.206 ***  0.198 ***  -0.035   -0.037 *  1.097  1.143   -24.277 **   -21.095 **  -0.100  -0.257   -9.405 *   -7.379 * 
Log(Real GDP per Capita in 
Borrower's Country) 
 
  0.015  -0.004  -0.126  -0.042  0.278  -0.189  96.155 ***  107.773 ***  -0.095  -0.295  20.475 ***  25.440 *** 
Market Return 1 Month Prior to 
Deal Close Date 
 








TABLE 9 (Continued) 
   
Dep. Var. = Number of Tranches (Poisson) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
















(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
 
(7)  (8) 
 
(9)  (10) 
 
(11)  (12) 
 
 
                                   






0.178 **  0.191 **  0.071 *   0.126 ***  4.510  6.198   -34.558 ***   -21.301 **  0.936  0.650   -12.227 **   -7.850 * 
Efficiency of Debt Markets in 
Borrower's Country 
- Tranches 
- Range   
 -0.004 ***   -0.008 ***  -0.117   -0.944 ***  -0.029   -0.334 *** 
Creditor Rights 
+ Tranches 
+ Range   
0.041 **  0.033 ***  1.213  11.800 ***  0.549 *  5.743 *** 
Corruption 
+ Tranches 
+ Range    0.027 ***  0.077 ***  -0.458  8.774 **  0.348  4.826 *** 
 
 
                                   




Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 




Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
 
                                   
Number of Observations   
  13225  13124  91791  91066  2748  2735  19573  19450  2726  2713  19562  19439 
Adjusted R-squared   
  .  .  .  .  6.4%  6.5%  7.4%  7.9%  4.4%  4.6%  2.2%  3.0% 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood   
  -20807  -20645     -122043  -120904     .  .        .     .  .     .  . 
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TABLE 10: Investment Grade Deals versus Non-Investment Grade Deals 
                                     
The dependent variable in all the specifications is "Number of Tranches" for Regressions (1) – (4), "Spread Range" for Regressions (5) – (8) and "Spread Ratio" for Regressions (9) – (12). The method of estimation is OLS for "Spread Range" and "Spread Ratio", and 
Poisson for "Number of Tranches". For the Poisson regressions, marginal effects are reported as coefficient estimates. All the variables are defined in Table 1, including the three dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered by year. Significance levels are *** for 
1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
   
Dep. Var. = Number of Tranches (Poisson) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Ratio (OLS) 
















(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
 
(7)  (8) 
 
(9)  (10) 
 
(11)  (12) 
 
 
                                   
Borrower has a Public Listing 
(dummy) 
+ Tranches 
- Range   
-0.191 ***  -0.188 *** 
 
0.054 **  -0.048 ** 
 
-21.963 ***  -20.630 *** 
 
6.507  6.966 
 
-3.720 ***  -2.795 *** 
 
0.880 *  0.848 * 
Log(Deal Amount) 
+ Tranches 
? Range   
0.162 ***  0.156 *** 
 
0.133 ***  0.135 *** 
 
9.281 ***  8.726 *** 
 
-6.175 ***  -6.102 *** 
 
0.678 *  0.326 
 
-1.121  -1.159 




0.037 ***  0.034 ** 
 
-0.014  -0.017 
 
0.083  -0.390 
 
-13.882  -13.424 
 
1.029  0.599 
 
0.260  0.308 




0.588 ***  0.608 *** 
 
- -  - - 
 
-22.835 ***  -23.184 *** 
 
- -  - - 
 
-4.149 **  -4.534 *** 
 
- -  - - 
 
 
                                   
Importance of Institutional 




0.014  0.041 
 
-0.037  -0.032 
 
-1.882  1.212 
 
1.082  1.091 
 
-3.811  -1.595 
 
-0.714  -0.872 
Log(Real GDP per Capita in 
Borrower's Country) 
  -0.062 ***  -0.021 
 
-0.065 ***  -0.114 *** 
 
11.429 ***  14.023 *** 
 
10.749 **  6.123 
 
2.483 ***  2.874 ** 
 
1.054  1.332 
Market Return 1 Month Prior 
to Deal Close Date 
  -0.010  0.009 
 
0.095  0.063 
 
11.199  11.463 
 
-7.617  -3.603 
 
5.161  5.294 
 
-11.251  -11.714 
 
 










TABLE 10 continued 
                                     
   
Dep. Var. = Number of Tranches (Poisson) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Range (OLS) 
 
Dep. Var. = Spread Ratio (OLS) 
















(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
 
(7)  (8) 
 
(9)  (10) 
 
(11)  (12) 
Common Law (English) 
Origin of Borrower 
+ Tranches 
- Range   
0.107 **  0.141 *** 
 
-0.048 *  -0.046 
 
-17.503 **  -13.053 * 
 
-14.050  -20.195 
 
-7.946 *  -7.988 * 
 
-0.879  -0.591 






  -0.006 *** 
   
-0.0001 
   
-0.442 *** 
   
0.295 
   
-0.130 ** 




+ Range     
0.049 *** 
   
-0.013 
   
6.122 ** 
   
-1.823 
   
4.018 ** 




+ Range     
0.043 *** 
   
0.036 
   
3.917 * 
   
1.671 
   
2.394 ** 




                                   




Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 




Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
 
                                   
Number of Observations 
 
94385  93654 
 
10631  10536 
 
20347  20225 
 
1974  1960 
 
20318  20196 
 
1970  1956 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
.  . 
 
.  . 
 
6.5%  6.7% 
 
5.2%  5.4% 
 
1.8%  2.3% 
 
2.7%  2.7% 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 
 
-130728  -129530 
 
-12689  -12572 
 
.  . 
   
. 
 
.  . 
 
.  . 
 
 
 
 